Is your Lovable app secure?

Lovable ships a working app in minutes, usually with Supabase as the backend. The app talks to the database straight from the browser, so the safety of your users' data depends on rules the AI may never have written. These are the gaps we see most often in Lovable projects, and how to close them.

Common security risks in Lovable apps

1. 1. Tables readable by anyone with the public key

   The Supabase anon key is public by design: it ships in your JavaScript bundle. That is only safe when Row Level Security (RLS) is on for every table and each policy limits rows to their owner. A table without RLS, or with a policy like using (true), lets anyone read or change every row.

2. 2. A privileged key in the front end

   If a service_role or sb_secret_ key ends up in client code, RLS no longer protects you: that key bypasses it. Privileged keys belong only in Edge Functions or server code, read from secrets.

3. 3. Third-party API keys in the browser

   Prompts like "add OpenAI" or "connect Stripe" sometimes produce code that calls the provider directly from the page with a secret key. Anyone can copy that key from the bundle and run up your bill.

4. 4. Missing security headers

   Generated apps rarely set Content-Security-Policy, HSTS, X-Frame-Options or X-Content-Type-Options. Without them, an injected script or a clickjacking page has a much easier job.

5. 5. Source maps and debug output in production

   Public source maps let anyone read your original code, internal routes included. Verbose error pages can leak stack traces and file paths.

What a FixPrompt scan checks

Passive checks on your public site, the same way a visitor's browser loads it. No attacks, no logins, no data queried.

• Detects Supabase and Firebase projects in your public code and flags them for an RLS / security rules review (no data is queried)
• Supabase service_role and sb_secret_ keys in JavaScript bundles
• Secret key patterns for OpenAI, Anthropic, Stripe, Resend and 30+ other providers
• Content-Security-Policy, HSTS, clickjacking and MIME-sniffing headers
• Public source maps, .env files and .git folders
• Cookie flags on session cookies (Secure, HttpOnly, SameSite)

Copy-paste fix prompt

Paste this into Claude Code, Cursor, Codex or any coding agent with access to your repository. A scan gives you a prompt tailored to the issues found on your live site.

Review this Lovable project for security issues and fix them in priority order:

1. For every Supabase table, make sure Row Level Security is enabled and each policy restricts rows to the signed-in owner (auth.uid()). Show me any table without RLS or with a policy that allows everyone.
2. Search the front-end code for service_role keys, sb_secret_ keys or any third-party secret key (OpenAI, Stripe, Resend, etc.). Move those calls into Supabase Edge Functions that read the key from secrets.
3. Add security headers for the hosting setup: Content-Security-Policy, Strict-Transport-Security, X-Frame-Options or frame-ancestors, X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff and Referrer-Policy.
4. Turn off production source maps.

Explain each change in plain English and tell me how to verify it.

FAQ

Is the Supabase anon key in my Lovable app a leak?

No. The anon (publishable) key is meant to be public. The risk is a table without Row Level Security, because then that public key can read or change all of its rows. A service_role or secret key in the browser is a real leak.

Does Lovable turn on Row Level Security for me?

It often does, but not always, and policies can be too broad. Check every table in the Supabase dashboard: RLS should be enabled and each policy should limit rows to their owner.

Can FixPrompt see my Supabase data?

No. The scan is passive: it records the Supabase project host it finds in your public code, never queries your database and never stores client keys.